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When economic activity is organized through markets, the notion of price is central. In the neoclas-
sical individualist tradition, price and value are synonyms; prices emerge in competitive markets from
the interaction of optimizing individual households and rms with given endowments, preferences, and
technology, and in that sense the theory of value is subjective. In the Marxian tradition, value is distinct
from price and only labour creates value. Such a labour theory of value is objective, and prices are long
run centres of gravity around which market prices uctuate. The relation between labour value and long
run price is the content of what has become known as the transformation problem.
The outcome of the last wave of major debates in the 1960s and 1970s has led to the view that the
classical-Marxian labour theory of value is logically inconsistent and so irremediably awed. And even
if some of the insights of Marxs theory of value can be salvaged, they are irrelevant for any meaningful
positive or normative purposes: as Paul Samuelson [50] famously put it in his blackboard theorem, price
magnitudes and value magnitudes are independent of each other, with a relation of mutual irrelevance.
A similar negative judgement was shared also by commentators who were less hostile to Marxist theory
in general. Joan Robinson famously argued, for example, that value theory provides a typical example
of the way metaphysical ideas operate. Logically it is a mere rigmarole of words, but for Marx it was
a ood of illumination and for latter-day Marxists, a source of inspiration(Robinson [45] p.39). Given
the central role of value theory in Marxian economics, these conclusions have led many commentators to
consider the whole of Marxs theory as dead.
This paper argues that such judgements are based on a particular interpretation of Marxs notion
of value and of its role in the understanding of capitalist economies. But rather than provide another
solutionto the transformation problem, our aim is to outline a unied theoretical framework which can
clarify its logic and in so doing emphasize the wide variety of possible interpretations of value theory for
which the transformation problem has no implications. To do this, we employ an axiomatic approach.
Following Thomson ([59] p.332), an axiomatic study has
the following components: 1. It begins with the specication of a domain of problems, and
the formulation of a list of desirable properties of solutions for the domain. 2. It ends with
... descriptions of the families of solutions satisfying various combinations of the properties.
From this perspective, it is possible to conceive of any approach to value theory as (implicitly) dening
a set of problems (including denitions of the main variables: prices, values, technology, competition,
and so on); formulating a list of desirable properties (axioms) of the labour theory of value, including
the specication of the role of value analysis; and then exploring the set of solutionsto those problems.
The axiomatic method then provides a new perspective on some old issues. In particular, the standard
approach to the transformation problem analyzed in section 5 below can be seen as identifying an
impossibility result: under a certain interpretation of value theory, and on the basis of some axioms
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concerning value and price magnitudes, the set of solutions is empty. But the axiomatic method also
provides a general formal and conceptual framework for analyzing di¤erent views on Marxian value theory.
One striking aspect of the debates on Marxian value and price theory is the lack of agreement on
virtually anything, including on what the actual issue of contention is. Part of the reason is that the
discussion is ideologically loaded. But a large part of the controversy stems from di¤erent views concerning
the key concepts, the basic methodology and the actual role of value theory. Di¤erent approaches do not
simply provide alternative solutions to a given problem, for there is no single way of posing that problem.
In terms of Thomsons description above, di¤erent approaches often identify a completely di¤erent set of
problems the solutions to which will have di¤erent properties. The advantage of an axiomatic framework
is to provide a unied framework to clarify these di¤erences.1
There is an enormous literature on the relation between value and price dating back to the publication
of Capital III in 1894 [31]. So three clarications concerning the scope of our analysis are in order. First,
there are several reviews of earlier debates, including Hunt and Glick [23], Desai [4] and Howard and King
[22]. This paper focuses only on recent approaches (from around 1980), most of which start from the
acknowledgement that, as originally posed, the transformation problem has no solution.2 Second, we do
not provide a survey of all of the (recent) interpretations of Marxian value theory but restrict ourselves
to those that have a clear and explicit quantitative dimension. Qualitative interpretations, for example
occasioned by the rediscovery of Rubin [49], fall outside of our survey. Third, as a logical inquiry into
the structure of value theory, we provide no exegetical evidence. All of the approaches we survey can be
presented and supported by careful analysis of Marxian texts.
2 What is Value Theory For?
One of the main arguments of this paper is that disputes on the transformation problem derive from
di¤erent views about the aim and scope of value theory (in Marx and beyond). And the popular view that
Marxs theory is fundamentally awed derives from the erroneous extrapolation of the logical problems
of one of the interpretations of value theory to all possible approaches. In this section, we provide a
classication and discussion of the main views.
1There is no single, unequivocal way of dening an approach axiomatically. It is largely a matter of emphasis whether
certain features should be considered as part of the specication of the domain of problems, or rather of the desirable
properties of solutions for the domain. Di¤erent axiomatic descriptions may be appropriate depending on the theoretical
exercise. The axiomatic method is not a substitute for intuition ... but instead ... a way of articulating [the intuitions that
hold in specic situations] into operationally useful conditions pertaining to an entire class of cases (Thomson [59] p.356).
2Although the discussion in section 5 touches upon various issues that are central in the Sra¢ an literature, the latter
falls beyond the scope of our paper. For Sra¢ ans, the labour theory of value has no relevance, and the issues that were
central to Ricardo and Marx can be analyzed with Sra¤as long period framework. For a discussion, see Steedman [58] and
Mongiovi [35].
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2.1 Description, prediction and evaluation
What is the labour theory of value for? The received view is that its main aim is predictive: labour
values are meant to explain (relative, equilibrium) prices. Yet even within a predictive interpretation,
labour magnitudes may be relevant to explain other phenomena of capitalist economies. For example,
one may argue that the labour theory of value establishes a relation between prots and exploitative
relations, thus allowing one to explain investment and growth. More generally, however, it is not clear
that Marxian value theory can only be interpreted as a predictive exercise. For there are at least three
distinct non-metaphysical interpretations of the labour theory of value, viz. (i) descriptive, (ii) predictive
and (iii) normative(Sen [54] p.175).
As for (i), Sen ([54] p.176) notes that Any description relies on factual statements. But it also
involves a selection from the set of factual statements that can be made pertaining to the phenomenon
in question: some facts are chosen and others ignored. The selection process is part of the exercise of
description, and not a metaphysical exercise.One descriptive interpretation of the labour theory of
value is that of capturing the process of formation of equilibrium prices in capitalist economies, as in the
standard view. But this is certainly not the only possibility. One may argue that in the labour theory
of value it is the activity of production that is being described, and the selection criterion is focused on
personal participation (Sen [54] p.177). It focuses analysis on human e¤ort and refuses to give the
same status to the ownership of [natural resources and capital] in describing participation in production
as personal participation through labour(ibid.).3 Thus, alternative formulations of the labour theory of
value have to be judged in terms of the motivation of the exercise of description in the particular case
in question(Sen [54] p.178).
Regarding (iii), the labour theory of value can also be interpreted primarily as providing the foun-
dations for a normative, evaluative exercise and an indictment of capitalist relations of production. For
example, one may argue that it explains the origin of prots as accruing from the exploitation of work-
ers and therefore shows the illegitimacy of capitalist earnings, and the source of signicant inequalities
of well-being. Or it may be taken as providing the foundations of a distributive approach based on
contribution and e¤ort.
Thus even at the most abstract level, there is no single, natural interpretation of the labour theory of
value. In addition to the standard predictive view, other interpretations that emphasize its descriptive
or evaluative role are possible. These interpretations are not mutually inconsistent. For even within
a descriptive approach, the specic interpretation chosen may depend on the actual motivation of the
analysis, which can be predictive or evaluative. Recognition of this diversity of interpretation is important
when seeking to identify the primary analytical focus of the various approaches: there are a great variety of
3This can be interpreted both as a descriptive and as a normative claim. As such, it o¤ers one possible reason why we
focus on a labour theory of value rather than, say, on a steel theory of valueand the corresponding transformation from
steel values at simple prices to prices of production.
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interpretations of Marxian value theory. Moreover, even within each interpretation (descriptive, predictive
or evaluative), several alternative formulations of the labour theory of value are possible. In the rest of
this section, we try to identify some of them.
2.2 The equilibrium price view
This is the standard approach, and historically the oldest. It contends that Marxs value theory provides
an explanation of the equilibrium prices of a competitive market economy. Marxs approach is seen as
falling within the classical economistslong period approach in which prots are interpreted as a surplus.
It will be convenient to distinguish two variants, a strong one and a weak one.
Denition 1 According to the strong equilibrium price view, relative equilibrium prices are equal to
relative values.
Denition 2 According to the weak equilibrium price view, relative equilibrium prices are determined
by relative values.
The notion of determinationin Denition 2 can be dened in di¤erent ways. Thus, relative equi-
librium prices might be determined by relative values in the sense that there exists a clear deterministic
functional relation linking the two sets of magnitudes (see, for example, section 5 below). Alternatively,
relative equilibrium prices might be equal to relative values up to a predened margin of error. We leave
the concept of determination undened in order to accommodate a range of possible views.
2.3 The prot & exploitation view
In this approach, the basic idea is that the purpose of the labour theory of value is to reveal the origin of
prots, the key variable in capitalist economies. At its most basic, capitalist society is a class society of
workers and capitalists; these classes exist in antagonistic relation to each other, and that antagonism is
based on the extraction of surplus labour from one class (the working class) by the other (the capitalist
class). Extraction of surplus labour is called exploitation, and it characterizes all types of class society.
But while exploitation is obvious in for example slave societies (slaves are compelled to produce more that
they consume) and feudal societies (serfs are compelled to work on the lords land for part of the week), it
is not obvious in capitalist societies where market transactions are voluntary. The purpose of the labour
theory of value is to then show how voluntary participation in markets nonetheless generates exploitation.
In sum, value theory provides the foundations for the Marxian theory of exploitation, showing that prots
result from the exploitation of labour.
Denition 3 According to the prot & exploitation view, prots are determined by the exploitation of
labour.
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2.4 The appropriate level of analysis
A further important distinction concerns the appropriate level of value analysis. The standard approach
to the labour theory of value is microeconomic and conceives of Marxian value theory as an alternative to
Walrasian general equilibrium for the explanation of equilibrium prices. More generally, one can identify
a general approach that can be called, to simplify, the microeconomic view according to which, value
analysis focuses primarily on disaggregated variables, such as prices, or an agents individual exploitation
status, or the labour values of individual commodities.
Denition 4 According to the microeconomic view, the labour theory of value applies to disaggregated
magnitudes.
Many recent approaches have rejected this microeconomic view, and have interpreted Marxian value
theory as explaining primarily macroeconomic features of capitalist economies, such as the aggregate
production of surplus-value, or the aggregate exploitation rate.
Denition 5 According to the macroeconomic view, the labour theory of value is primarily a theory of
aggregates.
The di¤erent views identied above are not mutually exclusive. An emphasis on aggregate macroeco-
nomic relations as the primary unit of analysis does not mean that microeconomic variables are ignored,
or irrelevant. If the equilibrium price view focuses on the relation between labour values and prices, it
nevertheless has to incorporate a notion of exploitation for labour values to make sense. So a value theory
that provides an explanation of equilibrium relative prices in capitalist economies must also provide an
explanation of equilibrium prots as the product of exploitation. Similarly, if the prot & exploitation
view is based on showing how exploitation results from market participation, then some specication of
prices is required. Hence an explanation of prots in terms of exploitation must also provide an account
of the prices in which these prots are measured. So categorizing approaches in the literature to each
view is more a matter of determining their emphasis than their exclusive concentration.
Neither are these views exhaustive. But they do encompass the main approaches that are expressed
in mathematical language. And given the latter, we emphasize the particular assumptions that drive
their di¤erent emphases.
3 The Basic Marxian Framework
Marxs vision of production was an advance of capital by a capitalist in order to make prot, an extra
sum of money over and above that which the capitalist had to advance to purchase nonlabour means
of production, and to purchase the use of labour. These inputs were combined in a production process
to produce an output which when sold generated revenues that both replaced the capital advanced and
produced more money as prot. The challenge was to nd a general explanation for this prot.
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For clarity, we set aside the complications related to unproductive labour, xed capital, international
trade, the public sector, joint production, and so on, and consider the simplest production structure,
a closed, private economy in which each sector i produces only one type of commodity.4 There are n
such commodities produced in a given production period, using physical inputs in the form of circulating
capital and one type of homogeneous labour. Production takes time. Suppose that production processes
have a uniform duration and let t denote a generic production period. Let the total value of the output of
any sector i during period t, it, be the labour-time required to produce the gross output of that sector,
Qit. (Unless the context requires it, we will henceforth drop the subscript t.)
Marx argued that what made commodities exchangeable in the market for sums of money, and hence
commensurable, was that they were all products of labour. He spent some time rening what he meant
by this labour (abstract rather than concrete, simple rather than compound, social rather than private,
and necessary rather than wasted), and he measured it in units of socially necessary labour-time.5 Then
the value of a commodity is the sum of the (indirect) labour-time embodied in the nonlabour inputs
(means of production) and the (direct) labour-time expended by workers when using these means of
production. Indirect labour-time is transferred from the nonlabour means of production to the product
of the production process and reappears as part of the value of output. While its location changes, its
amount remains the same. For this reason, Marx called the capital advanced to purchase nonlabour
means of production constant capital. When the output is sold, the capitalist recovers the capital he
advanced to purchase nonlabour means of production. But he also recovers the capital he advanced to
purchase labour inputs, and he appropriates a prot. Both of these Marx attributed to the value-creating
capacity of human labour: labouring activity uniquely has the ability to produce more than it costs. For
this reason, Marx called the capital advanced to purchase labour inputs variable capital.6 The extra,
over and above the sum of constant capital and variable capital, Marx called surplus-value. Formally,
in labour value terms
i = Ci + Vi + Si; (1)
where Ci is total constant capital employed, Vi is total variable capital employed and Si is total surplus-
value appropriated by capitalists in sector i, and all magnitudes are measured in units of labour-time.
Thus far, these are just denitions. Two steps are required to turn them into a labour theory of value.
Let the unit value of sector i be given by i = iQi . While value is measured in units of labour-time, that
measure is denitional, and it has to be combined with value being measured as a sum of money when
4These simplifying assumptions are made for expositional purposes, since the transformation problem arises, and has
traditionally been discussed, within the simplied context analyzed here. It is worth stressing, however, that modern
approaches to Marxian price and value theory provide solutions to the transformation problem that are independent of
these simplifying assumptions. See, for example, Flaschel [11, 12] and Flaschel et al. [13] on joint production and xed
capital; Duménil et al. [8], and Veneziani and Yoshihara [61, 62] on heterogeneous labour.
5These renements of labour and labour-time are not the subject of this paper. Henceforth the qualier socially
necessarywill be dropped; but units of time in this paper are assumed to be always so qualied.
6 In this paper, we follow Marx and assume, without loss of generality, that wages are paid ex ante.
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the commodity that embodies it is sold. It is this combination that turns a labour denition of value into
a labour theory of value. So the rst step is to assert that if prices were determined by labour values,





where pi denotes the unit price of commodity i, denominated in units of money; since i is denominated
in units of time, the value of money, m, must be denominated in units of time per unit of money.7
The second step is to provide some specication of the value of money. For Marx, reecting the
monetary arrangements and institutions of his time, money was a commodity (generally gold); its value
was determined, like all commodities, by the labour time required for its production, and its price was
unity.8 Hence for any value of money, the price of commodity i is determined by its value. Equation
(2) species the labour theory of value as Marx inherited it from Ricardo (but with more sophisticated
notions of labour and labour-time).
Three further points concerning equation (2) should be emphasized. First, given the value of money,
equation (2) is a statement of equalor equivalentexchange. Prices exactly reect values, so that for
each and every commodity its purchaser pays and its seller receives its full value in money terms. That
is, for each and every commodity, its value is exactly conserved in any market transaction. It will be
convenient henceforth to call the prices at which this is true simple prices.
Secondly, equation (2) applies to each and every commodity, including labour-power (the value-
creating capacity of human labour). Applying it to labour-power, and denoting its price as wi, the wage
rate per unit of labour time in sector i, and the value of labour-power per unit of labour purchased in





As soon as labour mobility is presumed, in long period equilibrium the wage rate will be uniform across
all sectors, with wi = w, all i, and so, by equation (3), vlpi = vlp, for all sectors i.
Thirdly, suppose that workers do not save and spend their wages on consumer goods (means of
subsistence).9 Let L be the total number of hours worked in the economy. Letting b = (b1; :::; bn)
0 denote
the vector indicating the amount of each good i consumed, and denoting whatever the ruling prices are
7The inverse of m is denominated in units of money per unit of time, and is accordingly called the monetary equivalent
of labour time. While some authors work with this directly, we use the value of money throughout.
8 In his numerical examples, Marx was generally explicit about this; for example he wrote, if 2 ounces of gold when
coined are £ 2 ...  ([30] p.163), and If then, twenty-four hours of labour, or two working days, are required to produce the
quantity of gold represented by 12 shillings ... (ibid. p.294). For an analysis of Marxconcept of money, see Foley [15].
We do not pursue the philosophical and exegetical literature on money in this paper. A sample might include Nelson [39]
and Lapavitsas [28].
9The assumption that workers do not save is conceptually central to the dualist approach. For expositional clarity we
maintain it throughout the paper to facilitate the comparison of alternative approaches. Yet none of the key arguments of
the paper depends on ruling out workerssavings.
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or the value of labour-power per hour of labour hired is the value of the bundle consumed per hour.10



























By denition, variable capital in sector i is advanced to purchase labour-power in sector i, and in value
terms this must be equal to vlp per hour of labour hired, multiplied by the number of hours purchased
li. So vi = vlp  li, and since vi + si = li, then si = (1  vlp) li. Dene the rate of surplus-value in sector
i as ei = si=vi. Then ei = ej = e for all i and j: because labour mobility implies a uniform wage rate





Thus far the basic structure of Marxs labour theory of value is the same as Ricardos: prices are de-
termined by values. And hence, for the same reason as Ricardo discovered (see Sra¤as Introduction to
Ricardo [42]), the labour theory of value cannot be true if it is combined with competition. Let the rate























where Q is the n 1 vector of gross output and the (row) value vectors c, v and s are dened in similar
manner to the vector . In long period equilibrium, as long as there is capital mobility, competition
must equalize the rate of prot across all activities, so that ri = r for all i. Yet, given equation (7),
two competing capitalists who advance identical total quantities of capital, but in di¤erent constant and
variable amounts, to produce an identical output cannot earn the same rate of prot; more surplus-value
and hence a higher rate of prot must accrue to the capitalist who advances more variable capital. This
is incompatible with capitalist competition, so that if the rate of prot is to be equalized, value must be
transferred from the capitalist who advances more variable capital to the capitalist who advances less.
10We assume throughout that hours of labour-power hired are unproblematically translated into hours of labour worked.
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To be exact, whereas the prices in equations (2) and (6) are simple prices, the prices pM =
 















Then, for a given value of money, the capitalist who advances more (less) variable capital must sell
his commodity at a price of production less (more) than its simple price. In this manner competition
redistributes value. Hence as long as proportions of constant and variable capital di¤er across di¤erent
production processes, the labour theory of value understood as equation (2) cannot hold, because it is
incompatible with capitalist competition.
Di¤ering time-structures of embodied labour had bedevilled the Ricardian labour theory of value.
Marx translated this into a di¤erence between price of production and simple price on the one hand,
and the proportions in which capital was advanced as constant or variable on the other. So dene the
composition of capital in sector i as ki where ki = civi . Then combining equations (6) and (7) and
rearranging,
mpi = (ki + 1 + e) vi:
Similarly, dene the whole economy composition of capital k as k = cQvQ : Then using equation (9), equation
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k + 1
(ki + 1) vi;










k + 1 + e




ki S k , pi T pMi :
Marxs prices of production are greater (less) than their corresponding simple prices in those sectors where
the sectoral organic composition of capital is higher (lower) than the economy-wide organic composition
of capital. But all sectoral transfers of value will cancel out in the aggregate because it is easily checked
that pMQ = Qm = pQ. Furthermore, it is denitionally true that aggregate prots,  = r




are equal to aggregate surplus-value at simple prices sQm .
In sum, Marx developed Ricardos labour theory of value not only by rening the concept of labour-
time but also by transferring the focus away from simple prices. Equation (2) does not in general hold, and
price-of-production-simple-price deviations are the norm. That is: unequal exchange, or non-equivalent
exchange, is the norm. For Marx, what anchored the system to labour values were the two aggregate
equalities; rst, aggregate gross value is invariant to whether it is measured in simple prices or prices
of production, and second, aggregate surplus-value measured in simple prices is identical to aggregate
prots measured in prices of production. Thus the proportionality of price and value magnitudes holds
only at the aggregate level, and only at that level is there equal or equivalent exchange.
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But there are two di¢ culties with this account. First, if prices of production systematically di¤er
from their corresponding simple prices in a long period equilibrium, then the right-hand side of equation
(10) appears to be wrongly specied. In a long period equilibrium, inputs must be evaluated at prices of
production, not simple prices. Hence Marxs procedure seems incomplete. Second, by the same token,
the average rate of prot in equation (9) appears to be wrong, since it too should be dened in price
of production terms. This is arguably more serious, because if the rate of prot is wrongly dened, its
use to dene prices of production will generate inconsistency. The transformation problem is therefore
concerned with the following questions: under what circumstances, if any, should Marxs procedure be
corrected? And if Marxs procedure is suitably corrected, under what circumstances, if any, can Marxs
account of a capitalist economy in terms of a labour theory of value be maintained?
4 Classical Long Period Equilibrium
Because many inputs have to be combined to produce output, if inputs are to be evaluated at prices of
production, the input-output structure of the economy has to be specied in more detail. Let Aij and
Lj denote, respectively, the amounts of physical input i and labour used in the production of the total
amount of good j. The corresponding amounts per unit of output are denoted as aij = Aij=Qj and
lj = Lj=Qj , and we shall denote the n  n input output matrix and the 1  n vector of labour inputs,
respectively, as A = [aij ] and l = (l1; :::; ln). The ith column of A is denoted by A:i.11 The vector of
aggregate net output is y = (I A)Q, where I is the n n identity matrix.12
Correcting Marx for incompleteness and inconsistency involves correcting equations (9) and (10). Let
pe, we, re denote the vector of production prices, and the corresponding (uniform) wage rate and prot
rate, which are in principle distinguished from the market prices of the same variables, and may be
interpreted as equilibrium values.
Axiom 1 (Long Period) Long period equilibrium prices (prices of productionor production prices)
are the prices that support an equalized rate of prot:
pe = (1 + re) (peA+ wel) . (11)
Equation (11) is a system of n equations in n + 2 unknowns. The system can be closed by specifying
the value of either of the distributive variables, (re; we) and by choosing a numéraire, which determine
equilibrium prices and the other distributive variable.13 In this paper, we follow the literature and
suppose that equation (11) is solved by specifying the wage rate. This can be done in a number of ways.
11We assume that A is nonnegative, productive and indecomposable, and l is strictly positive.
12These quantities are all determined ex post ; they are givens of the analysis, and no assumption concerning constant
returns to scale is made (nor is it necessary, Flaschel [12]).
13Given our assumptions on technology (A; l), it is well known that, due to a theorem of Frobenius, Perron and Remak,
for a range of values of the distributive variables, once either of (re; we) is specied, equation (11) has a unique, economically
meaningful solution. See, for example, Roemer [47] and Flaschel [12].
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One possibility is to take the money wage as given, which we explore in Section 6, so that it is the same
whether prices are simple prices or prices of production. This implies that across the transformation, the
real wage rate will change. Another possibility, which we consider in Section 5, is to specify the wage
as a real wage, in terms of the commodities b the wage purchases, whether at simple prices or prices of
production. This implies that across the transformation, the money wage rate will change.
However the wage is specied, aggregate equilibrium prots are total revenues less total costs, denoted





For most of the approaches we consider (but not all, as we shall see), there is no disagreement over
Axiom 1. The issue which separates di¤erent approaches is rather how to specify a value theory that is
compatible with Axiom 1.
5 The Transformation Problem as an Impossibility Result: the
Dualist Approach
Equation (2) is explicit about the value of money, labour values and prices, and thereby avoids dimensional
confusion between units of money and units of labour-time. However, if equation (2) holds for all i, then







Of course, letting commodity j be the money-commodity restores equation (2), and further assuming the
value of money to be unity normalizes all labour values. But the dominant approach in the literature
up to the 1970s treats this as a secondary consideration of choice of numéraire, and instead sees the
statement of the labour theory of value directly as equation (13). The labour theory of value was taken
as specifying that relative prices are determined by relative labour values. Notably, money is absent
from this interpretation of Marx (notwithstanding Marxs own emphasis on money in the rst three
chapters of [30]). With money reduced to an arbitrary choice of normalization, there was no conceptual
linkage between labour values and monetary prices. Instead, there was an underlying (intrinsic, invisible,
essential) system of labour values and associated exploitation, and a phenomenal (extrinsic, visible,
supercial) system of prices and prot rate. The question then was how the visible system could be
derived from the invisible system. If Marxs method was wrong, both incomplete and inconsistent, then
how should/could prices be derived from values? For around 80 years from the mid-1890s, the issue was
posed and analyzed in this manner. With separate price and value systems, this tradition has become
known as the dualistapproach.
Since the value of a commodity is the sum of the value embodied in the means of production and
the labour that works with those means of production, we can write the value equations as  = A+ l,
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so that labour values are uniquely determined by  = l (I A) 1. Hence immediately, y = L = lQ,
or the value of net output is the total hours worked. The value of the labour embodied in the means of
production is just the value of constant capital, so that ci = A:i; and, as before, vi + si = li.
Within the dualist tradition, a common approach has been to assume that workers do not save but
spend all of their income, and to follow Marx ([30], ch. 6, pp. 274-5) in specifying the value of labour-
power as the value of the commodities purchased with the wage. Then the value of labour-power (per hour
of labour hired) is the value of the real wage (per hour), as in equation (5). Notice that this specication
requires equivalent exchange in all individual exchanges, as in equation (2). It immediately follows that








which is non-negative as long as L  b = 0. Hence the value equations could be written more fully as




In this manner, the value equations are completely specied by the input-output structure of the economy,
the labour coe¢ cients and the real wage. Hence they are quite separate from anything to do with prices.
Axiom 2 (Dualism) Value magnitudes are determined independently from price magnitudes. More
specically, for all i, (i) the value of constant capital is ci = A:i; (ii) the value of variable capital
(value of labour-power) is vi = (b=L) li; (iii) the total new value produced is equal to total direct labour
employed, vi + si = li.
With the wage rate specied as whatever is necessary to purchase b=L, the classical equation for
prices of production, equation (11), becomes







= (1 + re)peM, (16)
whereM = A+ bL l is the augmented input coe¢ cient matrix. The system of equations (16) is linear and
homogeneous, and a necessary condition for a solution is that the determinant jI  (1 + re)Mj is zero.
IfM is indecomposable, then it has a unique positive eigenvalue 1= (1 + re) to which can be associated a
corresponding unique (up to a positive scalar) positive eigenvector pe.14 Choosing a numéraire to close
the system then completes the solution.
How then does this result bear on the derivation of the price system from the value system? The short
answer is that it doesnt. Since the augmented input coe¢ cient matrices for the value systemM+ebL l and
for the price system M are di¤erent, then the solutions to equations (15) and (16) will be di¤erent, and
so prices cannot be proportional to labour values. The point is that in the two systems the non-wage net
product is distributed di¤erently. In the value systemit is distributed in proportion to variable capital
advanced (dened in Axiom 2), whereas in the production price systemit is distributed in proportion to





total capital advanced. The same physical quantity of non-wage net product (albeit di¤erently evaluated
in labour values and production prices) is distributed over di¤erent amounts of capital. So the price and
value systems are di¤erent. This is summarized in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 (The Transformation Problem) Under Dualism and Long Period, it is generally
impossible that relative prices are equal to relative values. In other words, the strong equilibrium price
view is logically untenable.
Within the dual, long period framework, a rst reaction to Theorem 1 has been to abandon the strong
equilibrium price view in favour of the weak equilibrium price view and maintain that although relative
values are not necessarily equal to relative prices, they still determine them in some sense. While under
Axioms 1 and 2 it has long been known that it is possible to derive a precise relation between prices of
production and labour values (Pasinetti [41], Appendix to ch. 5; Roemer [47], Section 8.2), this relation
is far from the simple one that Marx proposed. For all sectors i, price-value di¤erences depend on how
the composition of capital in the production of i di¤ers from that in the production of the commodity
used as numéraire, both compositions being evaluated at prices of production. But they also depend
upon the the intricate network of relations between rate of prot and prices in the whole economic
system (Pasinetti [41] p. 136). Vector-matrix multiplication and matrix inversion might show a one-
to-one correspondence between labour values and prices of production, but that correspondence is very
much more complicated than the relatively simple relations which Marx adduced (see also Mohun [33]).
Further, the weak equilibrium price view provides at best a partial answer to the problems raised by
Theorem 1. For consider the aggregate proportionalities that for Marx anchored prices to labour values:
whatever the complexities at the individual level, at the aggregate level the relationship is simple. Let
TV and S denote, respectively, the total amount of value and the aggregate surplus-value produced in
the economy. Similarly, let TR and  denote, respectively, aggregate revenues and aggregate prots:
these may be equilibrium amounts, or just observed market magnitudes.15 Dimensionally, if price and
value magnitudes are denominated, respectively, in money units and in labour time, then any relation
between these value and price aggregates must be mediated by the value of money, and the aggregate
relation between them can be stated as:
Axiom 3 (Aggregate Proportionalities) Total revenue is proportional to total value and total prots
are proportional to total surplus-value. Formally, (i) mTR = TV , and (ii) m = S.
But were it the case that either m = 1; or labour values were dened in terms of money, or prices
of production were dened in terms of labour hours, the dimensional distinction between monetary
magnitudes and quantities denominated in labour time would be eliminated, and then we could write
Axiom 4 (Aggregate Equalities) Total revenue is equal to total value and total prots are equal to
total surplus-value. Formally, (i) TR = TV , and (ii)  = S.
15We prefer total revenueto the terminologically imprecise total pricethat is typically used in the literature.
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While the issue of dimensionality is theoretically important, we do not discuss it at this point: we list
both Axioms 3 and 4 and leave their variables undened, allowing di¤erent approaches to adopt di¤erent
notions of price and value magnitudes.
It may be objected that the relation between labour and monetary aggregates should not be considered
as an axiomatic property. Rather, the existence of such a relation should be, and indeed usually is, proved
as a result in a given economic environment, under certain conditions. Yet its central relevance in value
theory is such that its epistemological status in our understanding is as a postulate. We seek a model
which will make our postulated belief true(Roemer [48] p. 152). For an axiomatic study involves the
specication of a domain of problems, and the formulation of a list of desirable properties of solutions for
the domain. Axioms 3 and 4 formalize one of the key properties of Marxian value theory.
This distinction between Axioms 3 and 4 makes little di¤erence to our results here. For in general
there is no scalar m such that mpeQ = Q and me = S =  (Q AQ  b): by Theorem 1,
production prices are not proportional to labour values, and because there are n equations in equation
(16) but n + 1 variables, one further equation can be specied; this allows either (i) or (ii) in Axiom 3
but not both. Thus, a fortiori, Axiom 4 cannot hold either.
Specifying a numéraire amounts to choosing some commodity or composite commodity whose value
is invariant to evaluation at simple prices and prices of production (which is why Seton [55] called the
choice of a numéraire an invariance postulate). Since only one such numéraire can be chosen, this is
clearly a serious embarrassment for the interpretation that prices of production are derived from labour
values. For if the choice of numéraire is that total revenue is proportional to total value, then total prot
will not be proportional to total surplus-value, in which case the explanation of prot as originating
in surplus-value fails. Conversely, if the choice of numéraire maintains proportionality between total
surplus-value and total prots, then the macroeconomic labour theory of value fails.
The stronger version of the transformation problem can then be stated as follows.
Theorem 2 (The Strong Transformation Problem) Dualism, Long Period, and Aggregate
Proportionalities are inconsistent. In other words, the weak equilibrium price view is logically un-
tenable if either Aggregate Proportionalities or Aggregate Equalities is imposed.
Within the standard dualist approach to value theory, two main ways out of the impossibility high-
lighted by Theorems 1 and 2 have been suggested.16 The standard solution has been to drop Aggregate
Proportionalities (or Aggregate Equalities) and to deate the relevance of the weak equilibrium
price view to emphasize the prot & exploitation view. This is the literature on the so-called Fundamen-
tal Marxian Theorem (Okishio [40]; Morishima [36, 37]; Roemer [47]). For note that although Axiom 3
does not hold, comparison of the characteristic equations of the two systems shows immediately that,
regardless of choice of numéraire: (i) re > 0 if and only if e > 0; (ii) re < e (unless A = 0); and (iii) each
of re and e is a monotonically increasing function of the other.
16A third, more recent solution within the dualist approach is examined in section 10.2 below.
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The second solution originally proposed by Okishio [40] and later developed by Morishima [36, 37]
consists of a signicant weakening of Aggregate Proportionalities (or Aggregate Equalities) which
is required to hold only at the long-run equilibrium balanced-growth output vector (or the von Neumann
equilibrium output vector)(Morishima [37] p. 623). In fact, it is not di¢ cult to show that if the aggregate
output vector coincides with the column eigenvector associated with the largest positive eigenvalue of
M; then total revenues equal total value and total surplus-value equals total prots.17 Furthermore,
Morishima has shown that, under standard assumptions, there exists a dynamic process an iteration
procedure  whereby the economy reaches the state of long-run equilibrium balanced growth (or the
von Neumann equilibrium), and the price and output vectors converge to the von Neumann equilibrium
vectors.
Shaikh [56] has also proposed an iterative approach, arguing that it resolves the incompleteness issue
of Marxs own approach. He interprets the Marxian prices of production in equation (10) as the rst





pMk M; for k = 0; 1; :::; (17)
with 1 + rMk =
pMk Q
pMk MQ
for all k = 0; 1; :::and initializing the iteration by setting pM0 = . He then shows
that in the limit pMk and r
M
k converge to the dualist solutions p
e and re of equation (16). Further,




k Q is true at all stages k of the iteration
and therefore part (i) of Axiom 3 (Aggregate Proportionalities) holds.
These iterative solutions do not really address the issues raised by the transformation problem because
they do not provide a way out of the impossibility highlighted by Theorem 2. Morishimas solution based
on the iterative procedure restricts the validity of value theory to a rather special case, namely the von
Neumann equilibrium, which is reached by a very specic dynamic process. While Shaikhs iterative
approach is not restricted to a specic equilibrium path, this generality comes at a cost. First, while
equation (17) shows how Marxs own transformation procedure, once extended, can lead from simple
prices to production prices, Theorem 2 remains valid and therefore part (ii) of Axiom 3 does not hold.18
Second, as Shaikh [56] acknowledges, it is well known that a characteristic equation such as equation
(16) can be solved iteratively for peand re beginning from some arbitrary initial p0 and r0. But then,
it is quite unclear that his result identies a specic, unique relation between values expressed as simple
prices and prices of production.
More generally, both the Fundamental Marxian Theorem and the iterative solutions state how in
general the value and price systems are related, but that is all. There are no causative relations between
the two systems, which are di¤erent from each other and independent of each other. It remains true that
17Dimensionality issues are not relevant here since the price vector is the eigenvector of the augmented input coe¢ cients
matrix M, and is determined up to a positive multiplicative constant, so that only relative prices matter.
18According to Shaikh ([57], ch. 6 and the references therein), the reason why part (ii) fails to hold is because of transfers
between the circuit of capitaland the circuit of revenue.
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all that is necessary to determine production prices is knowledge of the physical structure of the economy:
the input-output coe¢ cients, the labour coe¢ cients and the real wage. Value magnitudes play no role.
Further, the same information that is needed to solve the value equations (15) is all that is needed to
solve equation (16). The value equations are therefore redundant.
This was the position reached by the end of the 1970s. And yet there are several oddities in this
received view. For one example, money is a casual afterthought in the dualist approach, emerging out of
a possible normalization. This seems to miss an empirically and theoretically essential aspect of capitalist
economies. For another, the value of labour-power is taken to be the value of the real wage (Axiom 2(ii))
and the same real wage is used to augment the input coe¢ cient matrix: Hence the real wage is held
invariant to transformation, which implies that the money wage in the price worldis di¤erent from the
implicit money wage in the value world. But no economic rationale is given for this latter. For reasons
such as these, more recent approaches question the coherence of this dualistic separation of the value
worldfrom the price world, and generically they have come to be known as single-system approaches.
Because they question this separation in di¤erent ways, they each have a di¤erent set of axioms from
those of the dualist approach and from each other.
6 The New Interpretation
The New Interpretation (henceforth, NI) has been proposed, independently, by Duménil [5, 6] and Foley
[14, 15].19 For them, the fundamental question is not how to derive prices of production from values that
are prior in some sense, but rather how the theory of exploitation, based on the value-di¤erence between
labour-power and labour, is compatible with the theory of capitalist competition. But while the theory of
exploitation is essential to the understanding of capitalism, the theory of competition embraces more than
the characterization of a long run price equilibrium. So combining the theory of capitalist exploitation
with the theory of capitalist competition must show the compatibility of class exploitation with each and
every price system (of which a long run equilibrium price system is but one example). Consequently, the
NI adopts both a descriptive interpretation of value theory as providing a broad theoretical framework
for understanding the dynamics of accumulation and distribution in capitalist-commodity producing
economies(Foley [18] p. 17); and a prot & exploitation view.
The NI formulation proceeds in two steps. First is an interpretation of the labour theory of value. For
the individual commodity, the labour theory of value is specied by equation (2) for some denition of the
value of money. This is how it appeared in Smiths pre-capitalist early and rude state, as a commodity
law of exchange; Ricardo extended this to a capitalist economy with produced means of production and
19See also Lipietz [29]; Mohun [32, 33]; Duménil and Foley [7]; Foley and Mohun [19]. It is worth noting that other
authors had anticipated some of the key elements of the NI such as the denition of the value of labour power (Robinson
[46]; Schefold [51]) or the existence of a conversion rate between money and labour accounts (Desai [3]). However, Duménil
and Foley were the rst to put these elements together into a unied approach.
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found that in general such a commodity law of exchange did not hold. It was rather superseded by the
capitalist law of exchange, specied as the determination of prices that supported an equalized rate of
prot.20 Marx then tried to show that the capitalist law of exchange merely modied the commodity law
of exchange in the sense that it took value from where it was produced and redistributed it according to
total capital advanced. In Marxs particular procedure, the deviations generated by this redistribution
summed to zero, and the NI argues that, in a certain (ontological) sense, they could not meaningfully do
anything else. It is this insight that motivates the NI, and it is specied accordingly as a fundamental
conservation principle.
Axiom 5 (Conservation Principle) For any specication of prices, the total value created by labour








Two features of Axiom 5 should be emphasized. First, it says that when the commodity law of exchange
(equation (2)) does not in general apply for each individual commodity, it nevertheless does apply for the
aggregate of commodities in net value added; their value in aggregate is conserved in exchange. Thus, at





The second step of the NI concerns the specication of the value of labour-power. The reason that
equation (2) does not in general apply to individual commodities is because of their di¤erent production
conditions (their di¤erent compositions of capital). So in general individual commodities must exchange
at prices di¤erent from their simple prices in order that value is redistributed through exchange. This









Yet labour-power itself is not a produced commodity, there is no composition of capital involved, no
rate of prot in its production that competition will tend to equalize, and hence no price of production
of labour-power. Consequently, in the sale of labour-power for a wage, the law of commodity exchange
continues to apply. That is,
Axiom 6 (Weak Single-System) In the sale of labour-power for a wage, the capitalist law of exchange





20The terminology commodity law of exchangeto describe equation (2), and capitalist law of exchangeto describe the
determination of prices that support an equalized rate of prot, is used by Foley and Mohun [19].
21As already noted, the adoption of the macroeconomic view does not imply that microeconomic variables are ignored,
or irrelevant in the NI. Indeed, Duménil et al. [8] have extended the NI at the meso-level by analyzing value creation at the
sectoral level. Further, in a series of recent contributions Yoshihara and Veneziani [61, 62, 63] have shown axiomatically
that the NI can provide an appropriate criterion to analyze individual exploitation status.
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In sum, because of di¤erent compositions of capital, equation (2) cannot in general hold. But for the
NI, equation (2) does continue to hold, rst for the aggregate of commodities in value added (Axiom
5); and second, in the sale of labour-power for a wage (Axiom 6). These are the key features of the NI,
summarized in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3 (New Interpretation) Under Conservation Principle andWeak Single-System, the
prot & exploitation view is logically consistent. Furthermore, aggregate net output is proportional to
total value added and aggregate prot is proportional to aggregate surplus-value.
Observe that, since the left-hand sides of equations (20) and (21) are equal if all the wage is spent,
then Axiom 2(ii) in the dualist approach cannot hold. Thus in specifying the value of labour-power as
the value of the real wage rate, the dualist approach presumes equal exchanges in what the wage is spent
on, and that is precisely what cannot be the case. The NI argues that the dualist approach is therefore
incoherent in its treatment of the wage rate and the value of labour-power. Rather than the real wage,
the NI takes the money wage rate as given. By equation (21), the given money wage rate determines the





As for prices of production, the NI formulation is the same as equation (11) in Axiom 1, but without
specifying we in terms of the workersconsumption bundle. There is no requirement in the NI either
to specify the wage as what it is spent on, or indeed to presume that all of the wage is spent. Then
from equation (11) one can derive a one-to-one inverse relation between the wage rate and the prot rate
which, by equation (22) can be specied in terms of the value of labour-power. The higher the value of
labour-power, the lower the rate of prot. But once the value of labour-power is xed then the rate of
prot and the corresponding production prices can be derived.
In one sense, there is little substantive di¤erence between the dualist prices of production and the NI
prices of production in that both derive from equation (11) in Axiom 1, for appropriate specications
of the wage rate. But consider again equation (22). This says that the value of labour-power is the
wage share of value added at any set of prices. This result is central to the NI because it demonstrates
the existence of class exploitation. Using Marxs metaphor, the value of labour-power divides the total
working dayinto a period of necessary labourin which the working class produces a value equivalent
to its wages, and a further period of surplus labourin which it produces a value which is expropriated
by the capitalist class as prot. At any moment in time, class struggle (for example, over the social norms
for the reproduction of the working class) determines how this working dayis divided. That is, class
struggle determines how much of the net value added the working class produces is won back in the form
of wages, and this class struggle determination of the wage share is no di¤erent whether prices are simple
prices or production prices. As long as exploitation exists, the wage share must be less than one.
The NI thereby shows that the existence of capitalist exploitation is independent of any account of
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price formation. That is, in the NI, equation (22) always holds, whereas equation (11) might not. Hence,
the NI is also a framework for empirical analysis, since the total number of hours worked, aggregate value
added in price terms, and the average hourly wage rate are all measurable quantities.
One may object that, albeit formally correct, the previous argument does not clarify why one needs
the labour theory of value to capture exploitative relations. For, in the NI, the existence of exploitation at
the aggregate level reduces to the fact that the wage share is less than one. This objection is not entirely
convincing. The NI does not dene exploitation as corresponding to a wage share smaller than one:
the equivalence, at the aggregate level, between exploitation and the existence of prots is derived from
more primitive axioms concerning the nature and determinants of value and surplus-value. Further, such
equivalence does not imply that monetary phenomena are all that matters while the notion of exploitation,
and labour accounts, are irrelevant. In recent work, for example, Yoshihara and Veneziani [61, 62, 63]
have extended the NI in order to dene exploitation at the level of individual agents and social classes.
They have shown that even at the micro level, the existence of exploitation is synonymous with positive
prots. The exploitation status of individuals and classes, and labour accounts more generally, provide
important positive and normative insights on capitalist economies, and their class structure, that are not
reducible to the wage share being smaller than one. Further, they have shown in [64] that, contrary to
a common view, the concept of exploitation is not just a complicated way of capturing the productivity
of the economy. Under the NI, the existence of prots is not synonymous with the existence of a surplus
denominated in any arbitrary commodity (as the Commodity Exploitation Theorem implies, for example
in Roemer [47]). Rather, a wage share smaller than one is synonymous with the exploitation of labour.
As a theory, however, the NI is incomplete, for two reasons. First, there is no theoretical determination
of vlp other than in the general terms of class power and class struggle. And second, while it denes m
as equation (19), it has no theoretical account either of its formation or its movement over time. While
equation (19) does imply that m will fall through time because of both productivity increases and pure
price ination, there is no account of pure price ination. While this incompleteness detracts neither
from the generality of the NI as an account of exploitation, nor from its usefulness as a foundation
for empirical analysis, it nonetheless requires further theoretical development. As such, it species a
progressive research agenda.
7 An Althusserian Approach
A rather di¤erent interpretation to the NI has been proposed by Wol¤, Callari, and Roberts [66, 65, 67]
(henceforth, WCR) and further extended and generalized by Roberts [43, 44]. WCR see themselves as
applying the perspectives and insights of the Althusserian tradition to the reinterpretation of Marxs
theoretical and economic texts (WCR [66] p. 565). Within this framework, the notion of causation
implicit in the dualist approach is rejected as both reductive and essentialist, resting on some essence
determining some consequent (such as, in the standard reading of Marx, values determining prices). In
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its place is a focus on overdetermination: mutual and reciprocal determination together with relations of
constitutivity. Constitutivity is the power of each aspect of society not merely to a¤ect other aspects, but
also to e¤ect them, constitute them, participate in determining the nature of, as well as the changes in,
every other aspect(ibid.). Because production and circulation are both overdetermined, the concepts of
value and price, understood as the form that value takes in exchange, are interdependent, and constitute
each other. They further change according to the degree of complexity of the economic processes which
actualize class relations, so that discourses themselves are changed.
In particular, the concepts of Capital III are, taken together, a di¤erent discourse from those of Capital
I; the new determinations of Capital III (such as inter-industry competition) require new concepts (such
as the average rate of prot), and the changing discourse requires corresponding changes in the meanings
of value and the form it takes in exchange. Because Capital I constructs capitalist class relations to
show how surplus-value derives from unpaid labour-time, and because Capital III shows how the form of
surplus-value, as prot, is also a relation between paid and unpaid labour-time, then WCR are adopting
a prot & exploitation view.22
Within this methodological approach, value is the quantity of social labor-time attached to the
commodity in production, given the nature and functioning of the processes involved in commodity cir-
culation. The form of value in exchange is ... the quantity of social labor-time attached tothe commodity
in circulation, given the particular processes of production (WCR [65] p. 123). Value and value-form
are equal in Capital I, but only as a preliminary step. In general, and in actual capitalist economies, they
di¤er quantitatively, both being jointly determined by production and circulation conditions. It follows
that, while value-formis a price, it is a price denominated in labour-time rather than in money. Given
their focus on individual values and prices, WCR adopt a microeconomic view. More precisely, WCR
adopt Axiom 1 (Long Period), but interpret it di¤erently. For them, prices of production are the mag-
nitudes of labour time that allow the reproduction of the capitals of each industry with a uniform prot
rate. Hence they can be called labour prices of productionand denoted pwcr. Thus in the discourse
of Capital III, Axiom 1 becomes the basic statement of the value-form, with its production prices pwcr
measured in labour-time.23 Interpreted in this way,24 Axiom 1 both constitutes and is constituted by the
basic statement of value which is written as Axiom 7:
Axiom 7 (Strong Single-System) The value of each commodity is the sum of the prices of production
of its constant capital plus the living labour required. Formally,
 = pwcrA+ l: (23)
22Roberts [43, 44] defends a strong version of the prot & exploitation view which holds at the level of individual industries
or processes.
23Of course, only relative prices of production are thereby determined; the further normalization equation (26) is discussed
below.
24Furthermore, Axiom 1 so reinterpreted is not understood as describing the long period position of the economy but
as representing, for Marxism, the condition for equivalent exchangeunder the competitive capitalist conditions of Capital
III, Part I. We are grateful to Bruce Roberts for this suggestion.
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Letting pe = pwcr, equations (11) and (23) provide a co-determination of value and value-form.
Together they dene a system of 2n equations in 2n+1 unknowns (, pwcr, and r), which can be solved
in the same manner as dualisms equation (16). Then a unique normalization can be specied by dening
the rate of prot as a ratio of labour amounts as follows.
Axiom 8 (Labour Prices of Production) The rate of prot is the ratio of total unpaid labour to





Letting pe = pwcr, by equations (11) and (24), it follows that
pwcrQ = pwcrAQ+ L; (25)
which implies that
pwcry = L: (26)
Equation (26) expresses a necessary equality between ... the direct labor-time expression of the net
product ... and ... the expression in labor-time terms for the revenues which are realized by the two
classes together when that net product is distributed between them through the circulation process
(WCR [66] p. 579).25
On the basis of the foregoing, and noting that pwcrQ = Q follows immediately by postmultiplying
equation (23) by Q and comparing with equation (25), the WCR Theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4 (Single-System) Let pe = pwcr. Under Long Period, Strong Single-System, and
Labour Prices of Production, the prot & exploitation view is logically consistent. Furthermore,
Aggregate Equalities is satised.
WCR conclude that the traditional interpretation that a valid Marxian transformation must explain
prices and the rate of prot as exclusively determined by physically embodied direct and indirect labor
time ... is... not the only basis on which to confront the price-value relation. Reading Marxs Capital as
expressing a view of the role of labor-time categories which is quite thoroughly opposed to the Ricardian
approach in all its variants has allowed us to resolve the traditional puzzles of the transformation problem
by posing them in di¤erent fashion(WCR [67] pp. 435-6).
However, two features of the WCR system should be emphasized that raise doubts concerning this
conclusion and more generally the WCR approach to Marxian value theory. First, the role of equation
(23) in the WCR system is unclear, because it simply adds n more variables and n more equations. It
is therefore not completely obvious that equations (11) and (23) adequately fulll the constitutive roles
25Alternatively, instead of Axiom 8, equation (26) could be given axiomatic status with equation (24) derived as a result.
This choice makes no di¤erence for our conclusions. We do think, however, that Axiom 8 reects WCRs [66, 65, 67] own
presentation of the approach.
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that WCR allocate for them. Conceptually, equation (23) can be interpreted as a part of a complete
value accounting system in which constant capital, variable capital and surplus-value are all expressed in
value magnitudes. Yet, formally, values are dened purely ex post and play no role either in the denition
or in the determination of any other variable in the WCR system. WCR solve equations (11) and (24)
for pe = pwcr and r, and the value equations (23) are irrelevant to that solution.26 Notice further that,
directly from equation (24), total prot in labour units and total surplus-value are the same. So the only
relevance of the value equations (23) is in showing that Axiom 4(i) holds. If that is all that equation (23)
is good for, its status as a fundamental constitutive relation seems somewhat articial.
Second, money plays no role in Axioms 1 and 7-8. While prices of production are denominated in
labour-times, one of these prices (say, the kth) will be a labour-time price of gold; dividing all other




, which is the WCR interpretation of Marxs equation (2) in an overdetermined Capital
III world. Yet, as in the dualist interpretation and unlike in other approaches money plays no direct
role in the WCR system, for its analysis of labour time accounting is independent of and prior to the
introduction of money and the denition of its value.
8 A Macro-Monetary Approach
Moseley ([38]) also o¤ers an explicit methodological account of values and prices. He proposes that Marxs
analysis be interpreted as focusing rst on the production of surplus-value, and then on its distribution,
so that a sequential (rather than a simultaneous) account is necessary. This contrasts for example with
WCR, who see both value and its form (price) as being simultaneously determined for a given level of
abstraction. Moseley o¤ers an interpretation which sees rst, a macro-determination of total surplus-
value for the economy as a whole, and then a micro-determination of how this total is divided between
di¤erent industries. Given the logical primacy of the macro-relations, we characterize Moseley as adopting
a macroeconomic view.
8.1 The macro-determination of surplus-value
Moseley stresses an interpretation of the circuit of capital which sees a given amount of money advanced
as (constant and variable) capital which reproduces itself together with an increment called surplus-value.
Because it is this latter that has to be explained, the money advanced is taken as given. His approach
implies that neither equation (2) nor its implication, equation (13), represent Marxs labour theory of
value. Instead, the latter is solely concerned with the determination of aggregate surplus-value in money
terms on the basis of aggregate money capital advanced. While aggregatemight be taken to imply that
26Roberts [43, 44] has developed the WCR approach by further analyzing the relation between prices and values, and
by considering economies with joint production and heterogeneous labour. Yet the fundamental axiomatic structure of the
approach is the same and it remains true that prices are dened independently of values but the converse is not true.
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something is aggregated, Moseley denies this on methodological grounds. Obviously the money advanced
is spent on denite quantities of inputs, but what is purchased is a microeconomic issue that cannot
be considered until aggregate surplus-value is rst determined. So while inputs are purchased at unit
prices which are presumed to be prices of production, these latter are (methodologically) posited yet
undetermined and so cannot be explicitly considered at this macroeconomic stage. Similarly, since these
prices determine the quantities that are purchased, those quantities cannot be explicitly considered. All
that can be considered is the total quantity of money laid out, and its division into what is spent on
means of production, and what is spent on labour-power.
Let C$ and V $ denote the total amounts of money advanced as constant and variable capital,
respectively, and let S$ denote the money surplus-value produced. By denition, money surplus-value is
just the di¤erence between total revenue M$ and the capital advanced to produce it:
S$ =M$   C$   V $: (27)
The new value created in the circuit of capital is L, the sum of necessary labour V hrs and surplus labour
Shrs. As in the NI, Moseley then imposes Axiom 5, the Conservation Principle, (the key assumption
in Marxs labour theory of value ([38] p. 31)), according to which aggregate new value produced is
proportional to total labour L. In the notation of this section,
V $ + S$ =
 















Moseley then applies Marxs denition of necessary labour as a macroeconomic denition.
Axiom 9 (Necessary Labour) Necessary labour in the aggregate is the labour that produces the mon-
etary equivalent of the total capital advanced as wages, so that
V hrs = mV
$: (28)





Theorem 5 summarizes these results.
Theorem 5 Under the Conservation Principle and Necessary Labour, the prot & exploitation
view is logically consistent. Furthermore, aggregate net output is proportional to total value added and
aggregate prot is proportional to aggregate surplus-value.
For Moseley, equation (29) is Marxs surplus labourtheory of surplus-value ... the main conclusion of
Volume I([38] p. 34) and hence the basic statement of Marxs labour theory of value.
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Theorems 5 and 3 are remarkably similar. They both rely on the Conservation Principle (Axiom
5). Furthermore, the NIs Axiom 6 and Moseleys Axiom 9 can hardly be considered as radically di¤erent.
Formally, Axiom 6 appears to be stronger than Axiom 9: whereas the NI applies equation (2) to the
commodity labour-power in Axiom 6, the NIs use of an hour as the basic unit is arbitrary, and multiplying
equation (21) through by the total number of hours hired yields equation (28). The converse is also true,
however. Moseleys methodological emphasis that the various monetary aggregates are scalar magnitudes
because prices are as yet unspecied is irrelevant in the treatment of V $. For with respect to variable
capital in money terms there are no undetermined prices. Moseley begins with the per-worker-day
relation between variable capital as wages and variable capital as necessary labour, aggregates up across
all worker-daysand then treats the resultant aggregate relation as a given. But since the wage rate is
known, one can also proceed in the opposite direction and so Moseleys Axiom 9 implies the NIs Axiom
6. Thus far then, the analytical di¤erence between Moseleys interpretation and the NI is slight.
8.2 The distribution of surplus-value
Having determined total surplus-value in money terms, S$, by equation (29), the general rate of prot
rmos is then dened as the ratio of S$ to the total money capital advanced:
rmos =
S$
C$ + V $
: (30)









(1 + rmos) : (31)
Notice that rst, rmos is determined prior to prices of production; second, the inputs for each industry are
commodities purchased at already existing prices (of production), so that there is nothing to transform;
and third, these prices of production are not unit prices but industry gross revenues. These latter are the
money capital advanced in industry i plus a portion of total money value produced, that portion being
determined by the ratio of money capital advanced in industry i to that advanced in the economy as a








C$ + V $ + S$

).
Moseleys sequential approach here appears to diverge from the NI (compare equation (11) for a given
money wage and equation (31)). His rate of prot is formed out of the aggregate money magnitudes
of Capital I, and, for Moseley, these latter are aggregates of quantities priced at prices of production.
Hence equation (31) does not determine prices of production; it only serves to distribute aggregate money
surplus-value among the various individual capitals. Yet, converting equation (31) into unit levels, it is
easy to see that it can only do that if equation (30) is in fact that equalized rate of prot that forms
prices of production at unit level. For prices of production have been posited at the outset, and the
mathematics only allows for one solution value of the rate of prot.
Moseley further argues that Marxs two aggregate proportionalities are always both satised, because
in his framework they are not equations but identities. By Theorem 5, part (ii) of Axiom 3 (Aggregate
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Proportionalities) is satised. And the total revenues of Capital I are identical to the total revenues of
Capital III because everything is denominated (whether implicitly or explicitly) in prices of production.
But that is neither part (i) of Axiom 3 nor part (i) of Axiom 4 (Aggregate Equalities), both of which
concern the relation between total revenue at Capital III prices and total value measured in hours.
Since Moseley proposes that his interpretation is what Marx himself wrote/meant, he has to specify
some relation between Capital I (or, identically, Capital III) total revenues and total value measured in
hours. There is obviously no di¢ culty in showing this for value-added, for that is what equations (28)
and (29) do. But no deduction is possible for total revenue and total value, since C$ is denominated in
prices of production which are not proportional to labour values. Hence, he requires a further axiom.
Axiom 10 (Constant Capital Proportionality) The labour value of constant capital is imputed as
CMos;hrs = mC
$: (32)
Then the combination of equations (18), (28) and (32) shows that part (i) of Axiom 3 is also satised,
yielding the following Theorem.
Theorem 6 (Moseley) Under the Conservation Principle, Necessary Labour, and Constant
Capital Proportionality, the prot & exploitation view is logically consistent. Furthermore, Aggre-
gate Proportionalities holds.
Theorem 6 is distinctive of Moseleys approach, and it shows that in his framework both of Marxs
aggregate proportionalities hold. Nonetheless, compared with Theorem 5 this comes at a signicant cost,
since it requires an arbitrary redenition of the value of constant capital. While Axiom 10 provides a
symmetry to Moseleys treatment of constant capital, variable capital and surplus-value, the interpreta-
tion of CMos;hrs is unclear, for this imputed value of constant capital is neither the hours historically
necessary nor the hours currently necessary to produce the means of production (Moseley [38] pp. 259-
60). It is rather a quantity of hours that is wholly determined by the prevailing value of money and
the aggregate amount of money advanced as constant capital. Its interpretation is therefore obscure,
and the argument appears contrived, suggesting that the only reason behind the redenition of constant
capital in Axiom 10 is to achieve a claim of Marxist textual delity via Theorem 6. Setting aside the
theoretically questionable Axiom 10 and focusing on Theorem 5, Moseleys approach is not substantially
di¤erent from the NI.
9 The Temporal Single-System Interpretation
An approach to Marxian value theory that has recently attracted both attention and controversy is the
Temporal Single-System Interpretation (henceforth, TSSI) (Freeman [21]; Kliman [24, 25]; Kliman and
McGlone [26, 27]). The TSSI adopts a prot & exploitation view and a microeconomic view, and supports
a weak price view, arguing that values determine prices, although these are not equilibrium prices.
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Consider the production period t. As production takes time, one can distinguish between the beginning
of t, when inputs are bought, and the end of t/beginning of t+ 1 when outputs emerge from production
and are sold. So far, we have not made this distinction because all of the main approaches (and indeed
almost all schools of economics) evaluate inputs at current or replacement cost rather than historical
cost. One reason is that we are interested in rms as going concerns, and in a situation in which prices
are changing, we want to know whether the rm is viable and can reproduce itself. With a labour theory
of value there is another reason: we want to be able to attribute the value of net output to the labour
that produced it. The TSSI insists on a temporalism and historical cost pricing (Kliman and McGlone
[27] p. 34) and we write the temporalist perspective as the following axiom.
Axiom 11 (Temporalism) In every production period t, the values and prices of inputs are determined
at the beginning of t, before the values and prices of outputs, which are determined at the end of t/beginning
of t+ 1, so that the former are determinants of the latter.
Axiom 11 is supposed to capture the inherently dynamic nature of capitalist economies. In the rest of
this section, the time subscript t refers to the beginning of production period t, whereas we use the time
subscript t+ 1 to denote the end of period t and beginning of t+ 1.
The TSSI further rejects the view that labour values and monetary prices emerge from separate
systems. This is instantiated in two di¤erent axioms. The rst one states that money magnitudes enter
the determination of values.
Axiom 12 (Value Single-System) Price magnitudes enter the denition of values. More specically,
for all i and t, (i) the value of constant capital is cit = m;tptA:it; and (ii) the value of variable capital
is vit = m;twtlit.
Assuming that total new value produced in every sector is equal to total direct labour employed, vit+sit =
lit, Axiom 12 immediately implies that equation (6) becomes
t+1 = m;tptAt + lt: (33)
The second part of the TSSI rejection of dualism is a stronger claim on the relation between prices and
values.
Axiom 13 (Price Single-System) Values and prices di¤er because of random, sector-specic devia-
tions. Formally, for all t, there exists a vector gt = m;t+1pt+1   t+1 such that gtQt+1 = 0.
Combining Axioms 12 and 13, it immediately follows that
m;t+1pt+1 = m;tptAt + lt + gt: (34)
Thus, assuming workers to spend all their income, so that wt = pt btLt , aggregate nominal prots are
Nt+1 = (pt+1   ptAt   pt btLt lt)Qt+1. Let it+1 =
m;t
m;t+1
  1, where it+1 is the TSSI ination rate. Then
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St+1 = ltQt+1   m;tptbt: (36)
That prots are dened in real terms is important in that the aggregate proportionality of prots and
surplus-value is interpreted in terms of real prots, not nominal prots. (See Theorem 7 below).
Axioms 12 and 13 concern the relation between labour values and market prices. As concerns prices
of production and the general prot rate, the TSSI makes two assumptions. First, it has a rather specic
view concerning the determination of the general prot rate, which can be formally put as follows.
Axiom 14 (TSSI Prot Rate) The general prot rate is given by the ratio between aggregate surplus-











, for all t: (37)
The second assumption species prices of production not as those supporting a long period equilibrium
but as determined by a markup on historic market prices.
Axiom 15 (TSSI Production Prices) Production prices are derived from applying the average prot
rate to historic costs evaluated at past market prices. Formally,









, for all t: (38)
Based on this axiomatic system, TSSI proponents maintain that the literal truth of all of Marxs
propositions can be shown:
Theorem 7 (TSSI) Assume that m;t > 0 all t. Then, under Temporalism, Value Single-System,
Price Single-System, TSSI prot rate and TSSI production prices, (a) all of Marxs aggregate
value-price equalities hold; (b) values cannot be negative; (c) prot cannot be positive unless surplus-value
is positive; (d) value production is no longer irrelevant to price and prot determination; (e) the prot
rate is invariant to the distribution of prot; (f) productivity in luxury industries a¤ects the general rate
of prot (Kliman and McGlone [27] p. 55).
Claims (a) and (c) follow immediately from Axiom 13: post-multiplying equations (33)-(34) by Qt+1,
using equations (35)-(36), and noting that gtQt+1 = 0 by assumption, it follows that m;t+1pt+1Qt+1 =
t+1Qt+1 and m;tRt = St, for all t. Claim (b) follows from equation (33) by assuming pt to be
nonnegative at all t. Claims (e) and (f), and the part of claim (d) concerning the prot rate, immediately
follow from Axiom 14.27 It is also easy to show that in the TSSI, the key claims of price and value theory
27The part of claim (d) concerning the role of values in the determination of prices is not entirely clear and we shall
return to it later.
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also hold if production prices are considered instead of market prices.28
In all frameworks considered so far, prices of production are the long run prices that support an
equalized rate of prot, and consequently they are equilibrium prices. But the TSSI axioms do not
specify what is to be regarded as equilibrium in its temporal framework.29 Indeed, the vector pTSSIt+1 is
determined on the basis of a uniform prot rate, a long-run condition which the TSSI regards as a very
particular case(Kliman [24] p. 99), or a rather restrictive postulate (Freeman [21] p. 249); yet this holds
in the TSSI even outside a steady state by assuming that the prot rate is an average rate of prot. But
If market prices do not coincide with prices of production, there is no reason to think that the prot
rate will be uniform across sectors. To assume a uniform prot rate in such circumstances amounts to
imposing an arbitrary condition on the sectoral mark-ups(Mongiovi [35] p. 408).
Kliman and McGlone deny that the TSSI eliminates the inconsistency in Marxs value theory by
supplying extra unknowns, in e¤ect by modeling a perpetual disequilibrium in which anything goes
(Kliman and McGlone [27] p. 50), because pt and rTSSIt are determined prior to p
TSSI
t+1 , and thus in
equation (38) there are n equations and n unknowns. Yet despite the large number of assumptions, the
formal structure of the TSSI is underdetermined. Consider the relation between TSSI values and market
prices. At a steady state, equations (35) and (36) become
 = mpA+ l; (39)
mp = mpA+ l+ g: (40)
But then there are n + 1 degrees of freedom, unless rst, it is assumed that in a steady state g = 0,
or equivalently, that  =mp; so that goods exchange at simple prices, and second, a formal denition
of m is provided. As regards the rst point, since gt is determined after market prices are realized,
the alternative to value-price proportionality is to deny the steady state so that prices determine values
historically. But then all variables are determined ex post by observed, unexplained market prices, with
little explanatory power. As regards the second point, there is no denition of the value of money in the
TSSI and so the model is undetermined. To assume m;t = 1, all t, and state that this implies no loss of
generality (e.g., Kliman and McGlone [27] p. 36) is unconvincing. In equations (39)-(40), if one assumes
g = 0 to avoid underdetermination, then the choice of m is largely immaterial in that commodities are
already assumed to exchange at their simple prices. But outside of a steady state, it di¢ cult to justify
the assumption that m;t = 1, all t.30 The absence of a denition of m;t casts some doubt on Theorem
7, which crucially rests on the assumption that the undened variable m;t is positive at all t.
28 In Theorem 7, TSSI proponents also include: (g) labor-saving technical change itself can cause the prot rate to fall
(Kliman and McGlone [27] p. 55). But claim (g) cannot be proved based only on Axioms 11-15. Indeed, the asserted
TSSI relation between labour-saving innovations and movements in the rate of prot is controversial (for example Veneziani
[60]). Di¤erent interpretations of (price and) value theory certainly have implications for the analysis of the dynamics of a
capitalist economy, but space constraints preclude their exploration in this paper.
29The following discussion draws heavily on Veneziani [60].
30Sometimes, TSSI proponents suggest that the denition of m;t can be derived by postmultiplying equation (34) by
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That an explicit denition of m;t is unnecessary to prove Theorem 7 highlights some conceptual
di¤erences with competing approaches. In the NI, for example, prices and values are distinct and m;t
is used to move back and forth between money and labour accounts(Foley [17] p. 7). Moreover, it is
Axioms 5 and 6, and the specic denition of m;t that follows from them, that make it possible in the
NI to retain the central ideas of the labor theory of value, . . . [although] they cannot and do not retain
all of the results that hold when prices are proportional to labor values(Foley [14] p. 42). In the TSSI,
instead, there exist no distinct money and value accounts, and the single-system qualication reduces to
the assumption that, apart from out-of-steady-state deviations, values are proportional to market prices.
Thus, as shown by equations (39)-(40), m;t is just an undened factor of proportionality between values
and prices, which can be arbitrarily (and, from the TSSI standpoint, without loss of generality) assumed
equal to unity.
Temporalism, disequilibriumand the extra unknowns, gt, are necessary to have some sort of trans-
formation problemto solve. But as Duménil and Lévy comment on equation (33), Sequential values
are clearly consubstantial with prices, within a labor-market price theory of value ([9] p. 127). Equa-
tions (33)-(34) show the temporal and logical primacy of observed market prices: the sequence fptgt=0;:::







. This is some
distance from the classical theory of value.
10 Stochastic Approaches
Despite many conceptual and formal di¤erences, all of the interpretations considered thus far share a
common feature: value theory and price theory are analyzed within a deterministic framework. In this
section, we discuss two less known approaches that substantially deviate from this assumption. They
rather conceptualize the main economic magnitudes (prices, values, technology, distribution, and so on)
as generated by stochastic processes and the transformation problem as relating to average values of
the relevant variables. In this sense, both approaches adopt what may be dened the strong average
equilibrium price view. Moreover, the focus of both approaches is on the prices and values of individual
commodities and the relation between the two sets of variables at a highly disaggregated level. Thus,
they adopt a microeconomic view.
10.1 Stochastic prices
From a descriptive perspective, Farjoun and Machover [10] (henceforth, FM) argue that in general,
labour is, par excellence, the essential substance of an economy, and should therefore be taken ... as







Unfortunately, this equation does not provide a denition of m;t+1: it describes its motion, provided m;0 is independently
dened. And there is no such denition in the TSSI literature. For further discussion see Mohun and Veneziani [34].
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the fundamental yardstick. ... [Economics] is about the social productive activity of human beings, social
labour ... the study of the social processes and structures by means of which and through which social
labour is organized and performed, and the output of this labour distributed and allocated to various uses
(FM [10] p. 85). This supports a predictive view that labour magnitudes are interpreted probabilistically
as the best predictors of actual market monetary magnitudes (prices and prot rates). The fundamental
theoretical tenet of their approach is that the labour theory of value was led into a theoretical crisis
not because of the supposed incoherence of the concept of labour-value, nor because it assumed free
competition, but because it attempted to reconcile value categories with the fallacious assumption of the
uniformity of the rate of prot(FM [10] p. 19).
In terms of our axiomatic approach, on the one hand, they take technology as part of the essential data
of an economy, and dene labour values as the standard input-output employment multipliers, accepting
the dualist approach to value magnitudes, including constant and variable capital, and adopting Axiom 2
(Dualism). On the other hand, however, they reject Axiom 1 (Long Period) and in general any theory
of prices based on the assumption of a uniform prot rate. They argue not only that such uniformity
is never observed in practice, even as an approximation, but also that the uniformity assumption is in
principle incompatible with a theorization of the capitalist system as a system of free competition and
private property in the means of production(FM [10] p. 28). For competitive forces constantly tend to
create new opportunities for prot and in a capitalist economy the very forces of competition, which are
internal to the system, are responsible not only for pulling an abnormally high or low rate of prot back
towards normality, but also for creating such abnormal rates of prot in the rst place (FM [10] p.
34). Such competitive forces include not only various pricing and marketing strategies but also technical
innovations, which take place at an uneven and uncoordinated pace, and technical revolutions (FM
[10] p. 138), which tend to scramble any putative uniformity in the rate of prot(FM [10] p. 35). The
uniform prot rate assumption misses the essentially dynamic nature of capitalism.
This entails a di¤erent theorization of capitalist economies. First, FM argue that actual market
variables should be analyzed adopting a probabilistic model, in which price, the rate of prot (and other
economic parameters, such as capital intensity) are treated from the very beginning not as determinate
numerical quantities, but as random variables, each having its own probability distribution (FM [10]
p. 25). Formally, let Kf and mktf be, respectively, the total amount of xed capital (valued at current




be the gross wage paid for the lth worker-hour, and let pmktj and j be, respectively, the actual market
price paid for a commodity (or a bundle of commodities) in the jth transaction and its labour content.
Dene  j 
pmktj
j
:  j is the price paid in the jth transaction per unit of labour content. The rst tenet
of FMs [10] approach concerns the probabilistic nature of processes generating market outcomes.
Axiom 16 (Stochastic Prices) Marxian value theory focuses on actual market phenomena and mag-
nitudes. Observed prot rates, rf , wage rates, wl, and prices pmktj are all random variables with given
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empirical distributions.
The second key departure from the standard approach concerns the denition of equilibrium. If a
competitive market economy has a state of equilibrium, it must be a state in which a whole range of
prot rates coexist; it must be a dynamic state, in the sense that the rate of prot of each rm keeps
changing all the time; it can only be a state of equilibrium in the sense that the proportion of capital
(out of the total social capital) that yields any particular rate of prot remains approximately constant
(FM [10] p. 36). This is a statistical equilibrium notion which di¤ers from both the standard Walrasian
concept and the long period approach.
Axiom 17 (Stochastic Equilibrium) Under perfect competition, the system gravitates towards an
equilibrium probability distribution of each random variable, whose general form (at least) is theoreti-
cally ascertainable and empirically veriable.
Axioms 2, 16 and 17 represent the theoretical core of FMs approach. In order to provide a solution to
the transformation problem, however, they need to impose some auxiliary assumptions that allow them
to use standard results in probability theory.31
First they postulate that the cumulative density functions of all random variables can be assumed,
with negligible error, to be smooth(FM [10] p. 69). Next, using a recursive argument, they show that
the price pmktj paid for a certain commodity (or bundle of commodities)  can be represented as the
sum of the total amount of wages, v0j , paid to all workers who participated directly or indirectly in the
production of , plus the sum total of prots, s0j , made by all rms involved directly or indirectly in the
production of  (each in respect of its workerspart in the production of this particular commodity




j as realizations of three random variables






















. Using labour values to weight



































is the sum total of wages divided by the






















is the ratio in which the total value-added embodied in the aggregate ... of all commodities
sold during [t] is apportioned between prots and wages(FM [10] p. 118). Therefore
E = (1 + e)Ew: (42)
31See Fröhlich [20] for an econometric analysis of the basic assumptions of FM [10].
32Therefore v0j and s
0
j are di¤erent from vi and si used, for example, in equation (6): they are monetary (not value)
magnitudes and capture the interconnectedness of the economic system. Thus, v0j measures the wages paid to the workers
involved in the production of the goods in transaction j, plus the wages paid in the production of the intermediate goods
necessary to produce such goods, and so on.
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This implies that the market prices of commodities are proportional to labour values on average. Fur-
thermore, by the Law of Large Numbers, it follows that if  is a large aggregate of commodities sold at
total price pmkt() and embodying an amount of labour (), then with high probability and a good
level of approximation p
mkt()
() = E , and by equation (42)
pmkt()
()
= (1 + e)Ew. (43)
Equation (43) holds as an approximation for any large aggregate of commodities, including for example
the consumption basket of the whole of the working class, b.





Under the assumption that workers spend all their income, pmkt(b) = Ew  L and therefore eM =
pmkt(b) (b)Ew







which implies that eM must be equal, or very nearly equal, to e.
Finally, let Wf denote the total wage bill paid by rm f and let zf =
Wf
Kf
be its organic composition
of capital. Dene the variable xf =
rf
zf
: xf is similar to what Marx calls the rate of surplus-value, except




: e0 is the proportion in which the aggregate value added is divided between capital and
labour in the economy.
The rates e and e0 are not calculated on the same basis: e0 is dened with reference to the rm
space; if we calculate [e0], for the period [t], we obtain the ratio in which the new value-added generated
during this period is being shared between capital and labour. On the other hand, [e] is dened with
reference to the market space; it measures the ratio in which the price, which is also the total value-added
embodied in [a bundle of commodities ] some of which has been generated before the period [t] was
shared between capital and labour(FM [10] p. 118). Nonetheless, in equilibrium the two ratios must
be extremely close to each other, because the ratio between total prots and total wages cannot change
rapidly(FM [10] p. 118). Therefore
E = (1 + e0)Ew.
It is now possible to see how these results provide a solution to the transformation problem. Consider
Marxs simple pricespj in equation (2). Unlike in FMs framework, they are ideal, rather than market,
prices and they are deterministic magnitudes, rather than random variables. If equation (2) holds, then
there exists some scalar  0 such that
pj
j
=  0 for all j, including labour-power. In section 3,  0 = 1m ,

















= 1 + eM , for all j. (46)
Noting that Ew = w = 1 by construction, it is possible to see the connection between equation (46), and
therefore Marxs simple prices, pj , and equations (42) and (43) dening the relation between market
prices, pmktj , and values in FMs probabilistic approach. Because  j is in general a nondegenerate random
variable, equation (46) does not hold in general and individual commodities are unlikely to be exchanged
in proportion to their labour values. Nonetheless, under the assumptions of FMs model, equation (43)
shows that when it comes to large and unbiasedaggregates of commodities, the specic price of such an
aggregate (total price/total labour-content) can, with high probability, be taken as very nearly constant
(FM [10] p. 135) and the market prices of such aggregates are very close to simple prices. Equation
(42) shows that the same result holds also on average.
Similar conclusions can be reached about the prot rates obtained by capitalist rms on the market.








where KG is the vector of total capital stocks employed in the economy. Recall that Q is the gross output
vector. Let IG denote the vector of intermediate goods used in production: by denition L = (Q) (IG).
Then substituting the latter expression into equation (47) and noting that since Q, IG and KG are very





But the right hand side of equation (43) is equal to the average rate of prot and therefore
rFM = Er: (49)
In other words, the value rate of prot is equal to the average money rate of prot, proving the link
between prots and surplus-value.
We can summarize the previous results in the following Theorem:
Theorem 8 (The Probabilistic Labour Theory of Value) Under Dualism, Stochastic Prices,
and Stochastic Equilibrium both the strong average equilibrium price view and the average prot &
exploitation view are logically consistent. Furthermore, Aggregate Proportionalities is satised.
The approach proposed by FM is innovative and sophisticated. Methodologically, it can be considered
as one precursor of the literature on econophysics (Wright [68] and Cockshott et al [2]) and of statistical
equilibrium theories (Foley [16]). But it is important to stress that it solves the transformation problem
in a very specic and limited sense. The distribution of the random variable pjj may be rather narrowly
clustered around the mean, but it is by no means degenerate. Therefore commodities do not exchange at
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labour values even approximately when taken individually. Marxs simple prices are a good approx-
imation of market prices only on average (equation (42)), or when large aggregates of commodities are
considered (equation (43)), and the probabilistic approach does not (and cannot) provide any explana-
tion of price/value deviations. Nor does it provide any theory of observed market prices, based on labour
values or otherwise.
Indeed, labour values play a central role in FMs theorization of the dynamics of capitalist economies,
as they capture the deeper technological structure of capitalist production beneath the surface of market
phenomena the real costof goods to society in terms of real human social e¤ort in production. For
example, they are arguably the most appropriate measures of labour productivity and can explain long
run e¤ects of technological innovations, including the so-called law of decreasing labour content (FM [10],
ch. 7). Yet in a dynamic perspective, the causality runs from price magnitudes to labour values: actual
and expected production costs and protability determine capitalist innovation activities and choice of
techniques, and therefore labour values (see also Flaschel et al. [13]).
One may argue that this lack of theoretical power is compensated by a more realistic set of assumptions
and a stronger empirical grounding. For if FMs arguments are correct, then for predictive purposes and
from an empirical viewpoint, Marxs simple prices may be taken to be a good approximation of actual
market prices. This result, however, is by no means unique to FMs approach. Indeed, a well-known
puzzle in the empirical literature on the transformation problem is a very strong correlation between
production prices and embodied labour values (see, for example, Shaikh [57] ch. 9, and Cockshott and
Cottrell [1].33
10.2 Stochastic technology
The stochastic approach recently proposed by Schefold [53] shares some important features with FM.
Most importantly, like FM, Schefold [53] adopts the standard denition of values as expressed in Axiom 2
(Dualism). However, he di¤ers from FM in two key respects. First, he adopts Axiom 1 (Long Period)
thereby both endorsing a dualist approach to the denition of values, and dening equilibrium and prices
of production in the standard Sra¢ an fashion. Second, consistent with the adoption of Axiom 1, Schefold
rejects Axiom 16 and a focus on market variables. The stochastic nature of the economy emerges from
the sphere of production, and not from market processes: it is the fundamental technical data of the
economy that should be interpreted as generated by stochastic processes. Formally,34
Axiom 18 (Stochastic Technology) Technology (A; l) is a random variable.
Although Axioms 1, 2, and 18 represent the theoretical backbone of Schefolds [53] approach, as in
FMs case, the solution to the transformation problem requires some auxiliary assumptions that further
33But note that the input-output methodology of these empirical studies implicitly assumes all labour to be productive,
which raises some delicate issues in interpreting such correlations as having anything to do with values.
34Essentially, matrices are random, if the elements on each row (which represents the process) are i.i.d. with a distribution
around a mean specic for the row (Schefold [53] p. 166).
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specify the properties of the main random variables.
The rst assumption concerns the production structure of the economy. Let  =(1; 2; :::; n) be
the vector of eigenvalues of the matrix A, where 1 is the (strictly positive) dominant eigenvalue.
Assumption 1: All nondominant eigenvalues of A are (approximately) zero. Formally, i  0, for all
i 6= 1.
It is well known that i = 0, for all i 6= 1 if and only if A = cf , for some two vectors c > 0, f > 0 where
c is a column vector, f a row vector and A has rank 1. If A is interpreted as a random matrix that is
a perturbation of A = c1, with 1  (1; :::; 1), then the nondominant eigenvalues are only approximately
equal to zero. To be precise, suppose the elements of a semi-positive and indecomposable matrix A on
each row (i) are distributed independently and identically around a mean specic for the row, and (ii) are
random, with a variance that is so large that many single elements equal to zero are admitted. Suppose
further that this matrix approximates the form A = c1, and its dimension is su¢ ciently large. Then the
non-dominant eigenvalues tend to zero, even if the coe¢ cients of A are perturbed considerably.35
In order to state the next assumptions, we need some additional notation. Let ui and ii denote,
respectively, the right (column) and left (row) eigenvectors of A, corresponding to the eigenvalue i,
where u1 and i1 pertain to the dominant eigenvalue. The components of u1 are in the same proportions
as Sra¤as standard commodity. This standard vector may also be interpreted as the average industry,
introduced by Marx in the third volume of Das Kapital(Schefold [53] p. 172). Accordingly, u1 is called
the Sra¤a-vector. As for i1, it is the vector for which prices would be equal to labour values at all rates
of prots, if it were the labour vector(Schefold [53] p. 173) and hence is called the Marx-vector.
The gross output vector and the vector of labour inputs can be expressed as a linear combination,
respectively of the right hand and the left hand eigenvectors. Formally, Q =
Pn
i=1 ui and l =
Pn
i=1 ii.
Then the next assumption imposes a constraint on the sectoral deviations of the gross output vectors
and the labour vector from the Sra¤a-vector and the Marx-vector: du = Q  u1 and di = l  i1.
Assumption 2: The deviations of activities from the average industry and the deviations of the labour





The next assumption focuses on some properties of surplus products and the labour vector.
Assumption 3: The deviations of the labour vector from the Marx-vector and the vector s of surplus





If the input matrix is a perturbation of A = cf , for a generic f > 0, then one more, crucial assumption
is necessary, which concerns the average of the deviations of the labour vector from the Marx-vector. For
every vector , let  denote the average of the components of .
35Tend to zero here means, as usual, that the modulus of any eigenvalue is smaller than any pre-assigned positive
number. For a more thorough discussion of the relevant assumptions, see Schefold [52].
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According to Schefold ([53] p. 174), Assumption 4 means that, because the individual deviations of
the labour vector from the Marx-vector do not disappear but its average disappears, the labour theory
of value does not hold for the single prices but on average, as it were. Formally, Assumptions 2 and 3




and dis = nd
i
s, and by Assumption 4, the latter vector products
are both equal to zero. If, however, the input matrix is a perturbation of A = c1, then Assumption 4
follows as a result as proved in the theory of stochastic matrices. Either way, this is the key property to
prove the following Theorem.36
Theorem 9 (The Average Labour Theory of Value) Under Assumptions 1-4, Dualism, Long
Period, and Stochastic Technology, both the strong average equilibrium price view and the average
prot & exploitation view are logically consistent. Furthermore, Aggregate Equalities is satised.
According to Schefold ([53] p. 176), Theorem 9 is a most surprising result, obtained after 120 years
of discussions of the transformation problem. It establishes that the Marxian transformation of values
into prices is correct after all, despite many refutations, if the economic system under consideration is
random(Schefold [53] p. 165). Theorem 9 is indeed a remarkable result as it provides a solution to the
transformation problem within the standard dualist framework, thanks to an innovative interpretation in
terms of random matrices. Furthermore, Schefold ([53], Sect. 3) relates some key aspects of the formalism
to Marxs texts, providing an interesting interpretation of dialectics.
Nonetheless, two caveats should be made concerning the interpretation of the results. First, Prices
are here not derived from values, but without having recourse to values from the structure of production
or of the values in use, represented by A and l, and from the distribution, represented by r. The formal
redundancy of the theory of surplus value remains(Schefold [53] p. 177).
Second, Schefold criticizes and rejects the NI because some of its results are little more than a
tautology (Schefold [53] p. 170). Yet, from a logical perspective, Schefolds approach is very similar
in that the key Marxian insights, and Theorem 9, follow straightforwardly by virtue of the axioms and
denitions. This is not to suggest that this approach (or others) are trivial. Rather it emphasizes the
fact that in all approaches the results follow in some sense from the relevant denitions and from the
axiomatic framework characterizing a given approach.
Indeed, our axiomatic treatment very clearly suggests that the strength of Theorem 9 lies entirely
in the strength of the underlying axioms, and the axioms are not entirely convincing, or at least are
insu¢ ciently motivated. For example, concerning Assumption 2, Schefold ([53] p. 173) simply says: Now
there is in fact no reason why the deviations of activities from the average industry and the deviations
of the labour vector from the Marx-vector should be correlated. Yet there is no reason (or at least no
36Observe that Theorem 9 proves that Aggregate Equalities holds. This is because, in Schefolds framework, only
relative prices matter. The proof of Theorem 9 is in the Addendum (not for publication).
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independent reason is provided) why they shouldnt. Even more puzzlingly, concerning Assumption 4 he
simply says that on average the deviations of the labour vector from the Marx-vector disappear. This
is a new assumption (Schefold [53] p. 174). To be sure, as mentioned earlier, Assumption 4 can be
obtained as a result from more basic premises, namely the assumption that A is a stochastic matrix that
can be approximately seen as the perturbation of A = c1. Yet, it is unclear why either theoretically
or empirically the matrix of material input requirements should be even approximately of rank one, let
alone have essentially identical columns. At a deeper level, one may even question the assumption that
the technology matrix A can be meaningfully considered to be random in the statisticianssense of the
word, as it is the outcome of certain processes of innovation and choice of techniques.37
11 Conclusions
This paper provides a new interpretation of the literature on the transformation problem by using the
language of modern axiomatic theory. This approach has signicant advantages in terms of clarifying
the exact nature and scope of the argument. On the one hand, it allows us to show that, on its own
terms, the transformation problem is an impossibility result. At a purely logical level, there is nothing
to discuss about it and there is no hope of solvingit. On the other hand, however, it forcefully shows
that the result depends both on a certain interpretation of Marxian value theory and on a specic set of
assumptions and denitions a specic axiomatic structure.
In the standard dualist approach that has dominated the debate from the publication of Capital III
up until the 1970s, money plays no role and labour values and monetary magnitudes are assumed to
form two conceptually separate systems. There is an underlying (intrinsic, invisible, essential) system
of labour values and associated exploitation, and a phenomenal (extrinsic, visible, supercial) system of
prices and prot rate. Marxian value theory is then interpreted as a predictive tool that bridges the gap
between the two systems: relative labour values are meant to explain equilibrium relative prices. Because
no robust relation between labour and monetary magnitudes can be proved in the dualist framework, the
conclusion is that Marxian value theory is at best irrelevant, if not irremediably inconsistent.
The axiomatic approach adopted in this paper has the advantage of clarifying the key assumptions
and the logical structure of the received approach, and it has allowed us to show that neither its general
conception of value theory, nor the specic axioms adopted are a logical truth. They can be, and indeed
have been, modied in various logically consistent and theoretically relevant directions. In closing this
paper, it is worth summarizing what we believe are the key departures from the standard view of these
recent approaches (albeit, as we have shown, with di¤erent emphases).
First, a strictly predictive interpretation of Marxian value theory is unnecessarily reductive. The
labour theory of value can be meaningfully interpreted as a tool for describing and understanding the
basic structure and dynamics of capitalist economies, and in particular the relation between prots and
37We are grateful to Gary Mongiovi for this suggestion.
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exploitation, even if embodied labour values are not good theoretical predictors of prices of production.
Second, dimensionality is important. The standard approach is dualist in that it interprets labour
accounts and monetary magnitudes as unrelated and separate systems. However, focusing on relative
values and prices eliminates and therefore obscures the fact that these magnitudes are denominated in
di¤erent units. Once that di¤erence is kept explicit, then the translation between the two relates labour
magnitudes and monetary magnitudes in a way that the dualist approach does not manage.
This leads immediately to the third feature: the labour theory of value is a monetary theory (because
a capitalist economy is a monetary economy) and that must require a conversion rate to move back and
forth from labour accounts to money accounts. So the value of money is a central concept. But more
than that, money is not a veil, concealing a set of real transactions; it is rather how value appears when it
is separated from the commodity. This further implies that the wage transaction is a monetary one: the
sale of labour-power is for a monetary wage, and that the value of labour-power is that wage multiplied
by the value of money.
No survey is theoretically innocent. We began in section 2 by noting a number of possible interpre-
tations of the labour theory of value. At its most general and abstract level, the labour theory of value
is a statement that, as long as labour is mobile, a decentralized allocation of labour is organized via the
natural prices of all activities when these are proportional to the human e¤ort expended in such activities.
This allocation of labour is modied by the distribution via class relations of the monetary form of the
surplus product. The theoretical challenge is to understand how this modication works in a context of
class exploitation. While this motivates the NI in particular, the various approaches we have surveyed all
have something which underpins their di¤erent assumptions/axioms. This paper has surveyed the logic
of the latter, but it should be clear that that logic can only take us so far.
Our survey then does not provide the nal word on Marxian value theory. Among other things,
we have developed our analysis at a purely theoretical level, and have neglected the important issue of
its empirical relevance. We hope to have shown, however, that the central question is not whether the
transformation problem can be solved, but rather whether modern approaches to value theory can provide
a theoretically rigorous framework that can underpin the analysis of contemporary capitalist economies.
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